Using U.S. quarterly data we provide VAR evidence showing that a positive productivity shock leads to a persistent decrease in the unemployment rate and in the price markup, together with an increase in aggregate profits. In response to the shock the labor share of income decreases on impact and overshoots its long run trend before reverting to equilibrium. To address these facts, we propose a model where Cournot competition and firms' entry in the goods market interact with search and matching frictions in the labor market. The price markup countercyclicality delivered by our model is a key factor to jointly account for the empirical facts we document.
Introduction
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we identify the effects of an expansionary technology shock on the unemployment rate, the price markup, the labor share of income and aggregate profits in a VAR framework. Technology shocks are identified by means of restrictions on the sign of the impulse responses as, inter alia, in Dedola and Neri (2007) and Mumtaz and Zanetti (2012) .
Using U.S. quarterly data between 1951 and 2011, we uncover four main facts. In response to the shock: (i) the price markup is countercyclical and remains below its long run level for several periods; (ii) the unemployment rate features a downward hump-shaped pattern: (iii) the labor share of income is characterized by countercyclicality on impact and overshooting; (iv) despite markups being countercyclical, the response of aggregate profits is procyclical.
The second contribution of the paper is to develop a model consistent with these facts. More precisely, we provide a general equilibrium model with Mortensen and Pissarides-style search and matching frictions together with endogenous market structures. Market structures are said to be endogenous since the number of producers and price markups are determined in each period. The model features firms' entry à la Bilbiie, Ghironi and Melitz (2012) (BGM 2012, henceforth) and oligopolistic competition, in the form of Cournot Competition, between producers as in Jaimovich and Floetotto (2008) and Colciago and Etro (2010 a and b) . Firms are large and workers may separate from a job for two reasons: either because the firm where the job is located exits from the market or because the match is destroyed. As in the bulk of the literature, wages and individual hours are determined according to Nash bargaining.
The interaction between search and matching frictions in the labor market and endogenous market structures allows to replicate the results identified in our empirical analysis. During an economic boom, expectations of future profits attract firms into the market. This strengthens competition and, via strategic interactions, reduces price markups. Despite markups being countercyclical, aggregate profits remain strongly procyclical. Thanks to markup countercyclicality, the model reproduces the response of the labor share to a productivity shock, which, as also shown by Rios-Rull and Santaeulàlia-Llopis (2010) for the U.S., is characterized by countercyclicality on impact and overshooting.
1 Finally, the model addresses the extensive margin of job creation due to firms' entry and exit. As in the data, new firms account for a relatively small share of overall employment, but they create a large fraction of new jobs.
In the conventional labor-search model each firm has a single job, and the goods market is characterized either by perfect competition or monopolistic competition à la Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) . 2 In this environment price markups are zero or constant and the extensive margin of job creation and destruction due to firm entry and exit cannot be addressed. Further, models with standard Nash bargaining match just the initial drop in the labor share, but fail to address the persistence and the rise above the steady state level.
We show that a persistently lower markup acts as a shifter of the standard marginal product of labor and creates a wedge between average labor productivity and the real wage. Specifically, a persistently lower price markup implies that the real wage rises relative to the average productivity of labor for several periods. This leads to the overshooting of the labor share.
It has to be said that the effects of a technology shock on employment are subject to debate in the literature. Adopting a long run identification scheme, where technology shocks are the only component that affect labor productivity in the long run, Gali (1999) , Canova et al. (2010) , Francis and Ramey (2005) , among others, find that technology shocks have a contractionary effect on employment. Their results are challenged by Christiano et al. (2004) and by Mumtaz and Zanetti (2012) who find the opposite result.
Papers closely related to ours are Ambler and Cardia (1998) , Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) , Hebel and Haefke (2009) and more recently Shao and Silos (2013) , Acemoglu and Hawkins (2010) , Cacciatore and Fiori (2010) and Kaas and Kircher (2011) . Ambler and Cardia (1998) consider a general equilibrium model with firms' entry and monopolistic competition, which features a perfectly competitive labor market. In their setting the number of firms in pinned down by a zero profits condition. Hence, while their model delivers a countercyclical labor share of income, the cyclicality of profits and unemployment cannot be addressed. With respect to Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) we provide a fully specified DSGE model where the dynamics of the number of firms is explicitly modeled. Hebel and Haefke (2009) consider a labor search model with firms' entry. However, their analysis focuses on the long run effects of deregulation in the goods markets for the level of unemployment and the real wage. Shao and Silos (2013) introduce firms' entry in a Mortensen-Pissarides-style model with monopolistic competition in the goods market. Their framework is characterized by small firms and constant markups. In their framework the overshooting of the labor share is due to the countercyclical value of vacancies. Nevertheless, this condition is difficult to test empirically. The present paper, on the contrary, provides empirical support for our transmission mechanism, namely the countercyclicality of price markup in response to technology shocks. Cacciatore and Fiori (2010) consider a model with endogenous entry and imperfect competition, and focus on the macroeconomics effects of structural reforms in goods and labor markets. They show that structural reforms are beneficial in the long run, but are associated to output losses in the short run. Acemoglu and Hawkins (2010) consider a model with large firms, decreasing returns to labor and an extensive margin of job creation due to firms' entry. Decreasing return to labor together with continuous wage bargaining deliver heterogeneity in the size of firms. They find that size heterogeneity implies responses of unemployment and of the job market tightness to a shock to labor productivity which are significantly more persistent than in the MortensenPissarides model.
3 Kaas and Kircher (2011) characterize firms' dynamics in a frictional labor market. They assume large, risk-neutral firms that can commit to long-term wage contracts and study the efficiency of the competitive equilibrium. We consider entry and strategic interactions to identify the role played by job creation of new entrants and variable markups for the dynamics of unemployment and other labor market variables. In Colciago and Rossi (2014) we study the role played by real wage rigidity for the joint dynamics of the labor share of income and labor productivity. We argue that while real wage rigidity implies a wedge between average labor productivity and the real wage, together with a persistent real wage dynamics in response to a technology shock, it does not suffice to address the overshooting of the labor share. On the contrary, we show that a countercyclical price markup is key to address the overshooting. This paper differs from Colciago and Rossi (2014) in various respects. To the best of our knowledge we are the first to provide empirical evidence concerning the joint dynamics of the unemployment rate, price markups, aggregate profits and the labor share of income in response to a productivity shock. Our model with Cournot competition outperforms the standard search model in replicating these dynamics, both qualitatively and quantitatively. The Cournot model delivers standard deviations of the price markup and the labor share of income very close to their empirical counterparts. In line with the evidence, the dynam-ics correlation between the labor share of income and output is positive conditional on a productivity shock. Importantly, this is not the case in the standard search model, where the sign of this correlation is negative.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical analysis. Section 3 spells out the model economy. Section 4 contains the main results and Section 5 concludes. In the Appendix we provide analytical details and the procedure used to identify productivity shocks.
Empirical Analysis
Consider a reduced form VAR
where
is a matrix lag polynomial of order p and
where A t is labor productivity measured as the ratio between real GDP and total hours worked, u t is the unemployment rate, v t is Barnichon's help wanted index (a measure of vacancies), Π t are real aggregate profits, µ t are deviations of the price markup from trend, s t is the labor share of income and Y t is real GDP. The VAR is run on U.S. quarterly data over the period 1951:Q1-2011:Q4 with four lags. 4 We use a labor share-based measure of the price markup. Under the assumptions of a competitive labor market coupled with a Cobb-Douglas production function, the labor share of income provides a measure of the price markup. However, in a labor-search framework the inverse labor share is no longer an appropriate proxy for marginal costs and hence for the price markup. As discussed by Krause and Lubik (2007) , the presence of labor market frictions reduces the allocative role of current real wages. In this case marginal costs could change even if the wage does not move. Rotemberg and Woodford (2000) suggest a number of corrections to the baseline measure to obtain a more realistic measure of marginal costs. Among them, they propose overhead labor, a CES production function and convex costs of adjusting labor. 5 Under each of these alternative formulations, marginal cost are more procyclical with respect to the baseline case.
Our empirical measure of the price markup is the following. Rotemberg and Woodford (2000) 
represents the average share of overhead labor over total labor input (assumed to be equal to 0.2), and s t ≡ w t H t /Y t is the labor share of income. A hat on a variable indicates percentage deviations from its long run trend. The same measure of price markup is adopted by Gali et al (2007). 6 As in Dedola and Neri (2007) , Canova and Denicolò (2002) , Lippi and Nobili (2011) and Mumtaz and Zanetti (2012) , technology shocks are identified by means of restrictions on the sign of impulse responses. As discussed by Dedola and Neri (2007) these restrictions are valid whether or not technology shocks are stationary and the only source of a stochastic trend in labor productivity. Thus, we need not to fully specify the stochastic structure and long-run properties of the VAR model, as would be required in a structural VAR with long run restrictions.
In what follows, we briefly describe our indentification strategy. The structural VAR approach views (1) as a reduced-form representation of the structural form
where A (L) is a lag matrix polynomial of order p, and the vector e t ∼ N (0, I) contains the structural innovations, assumed to be orthogonal. Identification of the structural shocks amounts to selecting a matrix A 0 that uniquely solves, up to an orthonormal transformation, for the following decomposition of the covariance matrix:
The jth column of the identification matrix A 0 , defined as a j , maps the structural innovations of the jth structural component of e into the contemporaneous vector of responses of the endogenous variables Y , Ψ 0 = a j .
The structural impulse responses of the endogenous variables up to horizon k, Ψ k , can be computed from the B (L) estimates of the reduced form VAR and the impulse vector a j . The sign restriction approach identifies a set of structural models, theÃ 0 ∈Ã 0 such that the vectors of impulse responses implied by each of theÃ 0 over the first k horizons are consistent with sign restrictions derived from the theory.
The approach exploits the fact that given an arbitrary identification matrix A 0 satisfying A 0 A ′ 0 = Σ, any other identification matrixÂ 0 can be expressed as the product of A 0 and an orthogonal matrix Q. The set of theory-consistent modelsÃ 0 can be characterized as follows. For given estimates of B (L) and Σ, take an arbitrary identification matrix A 0 and compute the set of candidate structural modelsÂ 0 = {A 0 Q |QQ ′ = I } by spanning the space of the orthogonal matrices Q. The setÃ 0 is then obtained by removing from the setÂ 0 the models that violate the desired sign restrictions. The findings can then be summarized by the properties of the resulting distribution ofÃ 0 models.
Thus, in contrast to the more commonly used identification strategy developed by Galì (1999) , which amounts to imposing zero restrictions on the long run impact of technology shocks, we use the sign of the comovements of a vector of variables in response to shocks to identify their information content.
Our results are robust to alternative identification schemes, to different time lags in the VAR model and to including additional variables in the VAR model. In particular, we adopted a more agnostic, with respect to the baseline, identification scheme whereby the only restrictions we impose is that a technology shock leads uniquely to an increase in labor productivity. Informed by our model, we considered two alternative specifications of the baseline VAR. In the first one we added to the specification the job creation by new firms. We imposed that the latter increase over an horizon of k periods in response to the technology shock, in line with the response of our theoretical analysis. In the second specification we augmented the baseline VAR with the number of new firms and impose the same sign restriction. When these restrictions are satisfied, IRFs in response to the shock conform with those obtained in the baseline VAR. However, estimates are very imprecise, most likely because the series of new firms and of job creation by new firms, provided by the BLS are rather short, starting only in 1992:Q3.
Strictly speaking, our approach requires stationarity of the labor share. Elsby et al. (2013) , inter alia, provide evidence of a secular decline of the labor share. However, Koh, Santaeulalia-Llopis and Zheng (2014) show that intellectual property products (IPP) capital accounts for the entire decline of the US labor share, but does not alter its cyclical behavior. Removing the effects from IPP on aggregate capital accumulation, depreciation and the price of investment they recover a LS that is trendless from 1947 to present. In other words our labor share measure does not account for IPP capital. This Figure 1 , displays the median (50th percentile) and the 16th and the 84th percentiles of the distribution of impulse response produced by our baseline VAR model for the price markup, the unemployment rate, the labor share of income and labor productivity over ten quarters. Our estimates suggest that after an expansionary technology shock the unemployment rate features a downward hump-shaped pattern, consistently with Mumtaz and Zanetti (2012) . In line with Colciago and Etro (2010) the response of the price markup is countercyclical and remains below its long run level for several periods. As in Rios-Rull and Santaeulàlia-Llopis (2010), the response of the labor share is characterized by countercyclicality on impact and overshooting. Namely, the labor share falls on impact in response to the shock and then shows an hump-shaped response, overshooting its long-run level.
8 Despite markups being countercyclical, the response of aggregate profits is procyclical. As shown in Figure 1 , profits increase by almost 2 percent on impact and then slightly undershoot their long run trend before reverting to equilibrium. The estimated IRFs reported in Figure 1 are consistent with those delivered by our model with Cournot competition.
As mentioned in the Introduction, the literature does not speak with is consistent with the economy we consider in the paper.
a single voice about the response of employment to a technology shock. Using long run restrictions, where technology shocks are the only component that can affect labor productivity in the long run, Gali (1999) , Canova et al. (2010) and Francis and Ramey (2005) find that technology shocks reduce employment. However, Christiano et al. (2004) obtain the opposite result. Erceg et al. (2005) argue that long-run restrictions are subject to a large estimation uncertainty about the impact of technology shocks on macroeconomic variables. Mumtaz and Zanetti (2012) argue that short-run restrictions, in the form of sign restrictions, are not subject to these shortcomings. Consistently with our findings they show that neutral technology shocks lead to an increase in employment.
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Finally notice that there is also microeconomic evidence supporting the propagation mechanism purported in our model. Manuszak (2002) , Campbell and Hopenhayn (2005) and Manuszak and Moul (2008) provide convincing evidence that markups fall after the entry of new competitors in the market. Bresnahan and Reiss (1987) provide direct support to the fact that stronger competition leads to lower markups.
The model
The economy features a continuum of atomistics sectors, or industries, on the unit interval. Each sector is characterized by different firms producing a good in different varieties, using labor as the only input. In turn, the sectoral goods are imperfect substitutes for each other and are aggregated into a final good. Households use the final good for consumption and investment purposes. Price competition and endogenous firms' entry is modeled at the sectoral level, where firms also face search and matching frictions in hiring workers.
Labor and Goods Markets
At the beginning of each period N e jt new firms enter into sector j ∈ (0, 1), while at the end of the period a fraction δ ∈ (0, 1) of market participants exits from the market for exogenous reasons.
10 As a result, the number of firms in a sector N jt , follows the equation of motion:
where N e jt is the number of new entrants in sector j at time t. Following BGM (2012) we assume that new entrants at time t will only start producing at time t+1 and that the probability of exit from the market, δ, is 9 Their results are robust to controlling also for long cycles in the data. 10 As discussed in BGM (2012), if macroeconomic shocks are small enough N e j,t is positive in every period. New entrants finance entry on the stock market.
independent of the period of entry and identical across sectors. The assumption of an exogenous constant exit rate in adopted for tractability, but it also has empirical support. Using U.S. annual data on manufacturing, Lee and Mukoyama (2007) find that, while the entry rate is procyclical, annual exit rates are similar across booms and recessions. Below we describe the entry process and the mode of competition within in each sector in detail. For simplicity, we assume that entry requires a fixed cost ψ in units of the final good, which is common across sectors.
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The labor market is characterized by search and matching frictions, as in Andolfatto (1996) and Merz (1995) . Firms producing in t need to post vacancies in order to hire new workers. Unemployed workers and vacancies combine according to a CRS matching function and deliver m t new hires, or matches, in each period. The matching function reads
where γ m reflects the efficiency of the matching process, v tot t is the total number of vacancies created at time t and u t is the unemployment rate. The probability that a firm fills a vacancy is given by q t = mt v tot t , while the probability to find a job for an unemployed worker reads as z t = mt ut . Firms and individuals take both probabilities as given. Matches become productive in the same period in which they are formed. Each firm separates exogenously from a fraction 1 − ̺ of existing workers each period, where ̺ is the probability that a worker stays with a firm until the next period. As a result a worker may separate from a job for two reasons: either because the firm where the job is located exits from the market or because the match is destroyed. Since these sources of separation are independent, the evolution of aggregate employment, L t , is given by
Notice that u t = 1 − L t−1 also represents the fraction of agents searching for a job. 
Households
Using the family construct of Merz (1995) we can refer to a representative household consisting of a continuum of individuals of mass one. Members of the household insure each other against the risk of being unemployed. The representative family has lifetime utility:
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, the variable h t represents individual hours worked and C t is the consumption of the final good. The family receives real labor income w t h t L t , where w t is the real wage, and profits Π t from the ownership of firms. Unemployed individuals receive a real unemployment benefit b, hence the overall benefit for the household is b (1 − L t ). This is financed through lump sum taxation by the government. Notice that the household recognizes that employment is determined by the flows of its members into and out of employment according to
The household chooses how much to save in riskless bonds and in the creation of new firms through the stock market according to standard Euler and asset pricing equations. The first order condition (FOC) with respect to employment, L t , is
where Γ t is the marginal value to the household of having one member employed rather than unemployed and 1/C t is the marginal utility of consumption. Equation (8) indicates that the household's shadow value of one additional employed member (the left hand side) has four components: first, the increase in utility generated by having an additional member employed, given by the real wage expressed in utils; second, the decrease in utility due to more hours dedicated to work, given by the marginal disutility of employment; third the foregone utility value of the unemployment benefit b/C t ; fourth, the continuation utility value, given by the contribution of a current match to next period household's employment. 
Firms and Technology
The final good is produced aggregating a continuum of measure one of sectoral goods according to the function
13 In the Appendix the details of the derivations.
where Y jt denotes output of sector j and ω is the elasticity of substitution between any two different sectoral goods. The final good producer behave competitively. In each sector j, there are N jt > 1 firms producing differentiated goods that are aggregated into a sectoral good by a CES aggregating function defined as:
where y jt (i) is the production of good i in sector j, ε > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between sectoral goods.
14 As in Colciago and Etro (2010 a), we assume a unit elasticity of substitution between goods belonging to different sectors. This allows to realistically separate limited substitutability at the aggregated level, and high substitutability at the disaggregated level. Each firm i in sector j produces a differentiated good with the following production function
where A t represents technology which is common across sectors and evolves exogenously over time. Variable n jt (i) is firm i's time-t workforce and h jt (i) represents hours per employee. Period-t real profits of a firm are defined as
where w jt (i) is the real wage paid by firm i, v jt (i) represents the number of vacancies posted at time t and κ is the output cost of keeping a vacancy open. The value of a firm is the expected discounted value of its future profits
is the households' stochastic discount factor which takes into account that firms' survival probability is 1 − δ. Firms which do not exit from the market have a time-t individual workforce given by
14 The term N The unit intersectoral elasticity of substitution implies that the nominal expenditure, EXP t , is identical across sectors. Thus, the final producer's demand for each sectoral good is
where P jt is the price index of sector j and P t is the price of the final good at period t. Denoting with p jt (i) the price of good i in sector j, the demand faced by the producer of each variant is
where P jt is defined as
Using (16) and (15) the individual demand of good i can be written as a function of aggregate expenditure,
As technology, the entry cost and the exit probability are identical across sectors, in what follows we drop the index j and refer to a representative sector. As a result
Cournot Competition
Let us consider competition in quantities. Contrary to the traditional Dixit-Stiglitz approach which neglects strategic interactions between firms, we take these into consideration and derive the exact Cournot equilibrium. Each firm i chooses y t (i), n t (i) and v t (i) to maximize π t (i)+V t (i), taking as given the quantity of the other firms in the sector. The firm problem is to maximize profits subject to the inverse demand function, given by:
which implies that period profits can be written as
and the constraint (18) is replaced by
In what follows we distinguish between producers according to their period of entry. We define as new firms those producing units which entered the market in period t − 1 and at time t produce for the first time. 15 The term incumbent firms refers, instead, to producers which entered the market in period t − 2 or prior. The distinction is relevant because new firms have no beginning of period workforce. Nevertheless, in a separate appendix we show that all producing firms in the Cournot equilibrium, independently of the period of entry, have the same size, impose the same markup over a common marginal cost and have the same individual level of production. For this reason in what follows we drop the index i denoting variables relative to the individual firm. Optimal pricing implies that the relative price chosen by firms is
where are nominal marginal costs, and µ t the endogenous markup,
Notice that the markup is decreasing in the degree of substitutability between products θ, with an elasticity ǫ θ = 1/(θ − 1). The markup remains positive for any degree of substitutability, since even in the case of homogenous goods, we have lim θ→∞ µ(θ, N t ) = N t /(N t − 1).
Job Creation Condition
The first order condition (FOC) with respect to vacancies reads as
Thus, the firm sets the value of the marginal worker, φ t , equal to the expected cost of hiring the worker,
. The FOC with respect to employment reads as
Condition (24) implies that the value of the marginal worker is represented by the profits associated to the additional worker, the term in brackets, plus the continuation value. Next period, with probability ̺ the match is not severed. In this event the firm obtains the future expected value of a job. Combining the latter two equations delivers the Job Creation Condition (JCC)
where we used the pricing condition to substitute for mc t = 1 µ t . Since the ratio 1 µ t increases in the number of firms, it follows that competition leads to a rise in the marginal cost and hence in the equilibrium marginal revenue. For this reason the marginal revenue product of labor (MRP), given by 1 µ t A t h t , also rises with competition. Thus, stronger competition promotes the creation of vacancies and employment due to its positive effect on the MRP of labor.
Hiring policy
Let π new t and v new t be, respectively, the real profits and the number of vacancies posted by a new firm. Symmetrically, π t and v t define, respectively, the individual profits and vacancies posted by an incumbent producer. New firms and incumbent firms are characterized by the same size, n t . Thus, the optimal hiring policy of new firms, which have no initial workforce, consists in posting at time t as many vacancies as required to hire n t workers. As a result v new t = nt qt . Since n t = ̺n t−1 + v t q t , it has to be the case that
Hence, a new firm posts more vacancies than an incumbent producer. For this reason, and given vacancy posting is costly, the profits of new firms are lower than those of incumbent firms. To see this, notice that
Substituting equation (26) in the latter delivers
The last equality follows from the fact that the term in the round bracket represents the profits of an incumbent producer, π t . Consistently with the U.S. empirical evidence in Haltiwanger et al. (2010) and Cooley and Quadrini (2001) , a young firm creates on average more new jobs than a mature firm and distributes lower dividends.
Endogenous Entry
In each period the level of entry is determined endogenously to equate the value of a new entrant, V e t , to the entry cost
Notice that perspective new entrants have lower value than producing firms because they will have, in case they do not exit from the market before starting production, to set up a workforce in their first period of activity. The difference in the value between a firm which is already producing and a perspective entrant is, in fact, the discounted value of the higher vacancy posting cost that the latter will suffer, with respect to the former, in the first period of activity. Formally
( 30) where V t is the value of a producing firm (both new firms and incumbent firms) at time t.
Bargaining over Wages and Hours
As in Trigari (2009), individual bargaining takes place along two dimensions: the real wage and the hours of work. We assume Nash bargaining. That is, the firm and the worker choose the wage w t and the hours of work h t to maximize the Nash product
where φ t is firm value of having an additional worker, while Γ t C t is the household's surplus expressed in units of consumption. The parameter η reflects the parties' relative bargaining power. The FOC with respect to the real wage is
Using the definition of φ t in equation (24) and that of Γ t given by equation (8), after some manipulations, yields the wage equation
where we used zt qt
and mc t = 1 µ t . The wage shares costs and benefits associated to the match according to the parameter η. The worker is rewarded for a fraction η of the firm's revenues and savings of hiring costs and compensated for a fraction 1 − η of the disutility he suffers from supplying labor and the foregone unemployment benefits. A distinguishing feature of our approach is that the wage depends on the degree of competition in the goods market. The direct effect of competition on the real wage is captured through the term η 1 µ t A t h t , which represents the share of the MRP which goes to workers. As discussed above, entry leads to an increase in the ratio 1 µ t and hence in the MRP. Thus, everything else equal, stronger competition shifts the wage curve up. This result is similar to that in Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) , who find a positive effect of competition on the real wage. The FOC with respect to h t yields
Because the firm and the worker bargain simultaneously about wages and hours, the outcome is (privately) efficient and the wage does not play an allocational role for hours. Stronger competition leads to an increase in hours bargained between the workers and firms for the same reasons for which competition positively affects the wage schedule. 
Aggregation and Market Clearing
Considering that sectors are symmetric and have a unit mass, the sectoral number of firms and new entrants also represents their aggregate counterpart. Thus, the dynamics of the aggregate number of firms is
The firms' individual workforce, n t , is identical across producers, hence L t = N t n t . The aggregate production function is: is the number of new firms. Aggregating the budget constraints of households we obtain the aggregate resource constraint of the economy
which states that the sum of consumption and investment in new entrants must equal the sum between labor income and aggregate profits, Π t , distributed to households at time t. Aggregate profits are defined as
16 Notice that we ruled out the possibility of a hiring externality. This simplifies the derivation of the wage equation. Further, Ebell and Haefke (2009) show that the quantitative effect of overhiring is minor.
Goods' market clearing requires
Finally, the dynamics of aggregate employment reads as
which shows that workers employed into a firm which exits the market join the mass of unemployed. The Appendix lists the full set of equilibrium conditions for the economy.
Calibration
Calibration is conducted on a quarterly basis as in Shimer (2005) and Blanchard and Galì (2010) among others. 17 The discount factor, β, is set to the standard value of 0.99, while the rate of business destruction, δ, equals 0.025 to match the U.S. empirical level of 10 percent business destruction a year reported by BGM (2012). The baseline value for the entry cost is set to one, which leads to a ratio of investment to output close to 15 per cent, as in BGM (2012). With no loss of generality, the value of χ is such that steady state labor supply equals one. In this case the Frisch elasticity of labor supply reduces to ϕ, to which we assign a value of 1/2 in line with the evidence. We take as the baseline value for the intersectoral elasticity of substitution ε = 20. This leads to a steady state markup equal to 28 percent. This value is within the range estimated by Oliveira Martins and Scarpetta (1999) for a large number of U.S. manufacturing sectors. Technology is assumed to follow a first order autoregressive process given byÂ t = ρ AÂ t−1 + ε At , whereÂ t = ln (A t /A) and ρ A ∈ (0, 1) and ε At is a white noise disturbance, with zero expected value and standard deviation σ A . As standard in the literature we set the steady state marginal productivity of labor, A, to 1. We calibrate the productivity process in order to mimic the dynamic of labor productivity obtained from our VAR estimates. This requires setting ρ A = 0.9 and standard deviation σ A = 0.0035. Next we turn to parameters that are specific to the search and matching framework. The aggregate separation rate is 1 − (1 − δ) ̺. We set ̺ such that the the latter equals 0.1, as suggested by estimates provided by Hall (1995) and Davis et al. (1996) . The elasticity of matches to unemployment is γ = , as 17 The computation of the steady state is in the Appendix.
in the bulk of the literature. We then set the the efficiency parameter in matching, γ m , and the steady state job market tightness to target an average job finding rate, z, equal to 0.7 and a vacancy filling rate, q, equal to 0.9. We draw the latter value from Andolfatto (1996) and De Haan et al. (2000) , while the former from Blanchard and Galì (2010) . Notice that a job finding rate equal to 0.7 corresponds, approximately, to a monthly rate of 0.3, consistent with the U.S. evidence. Since we consider a labor-leisure choice, the overall replacement rate is given by the sum between the unemployment insurance benefit and the disutility cost of working. We calibrate the latter to 0.75. The cost of posting a vacancy κ is obtained by equating the steady state version of the JCC and the steady state wage setting equation. The steady state rate of unemployment is equal to u = 1−(1−δ)̺ qθ+(1−(1−δ)̺) = 0.125, which is increasing in the rate, δ, of business destruction and in the exogenous, firm-level job separation rate, ̺. As expected the unemployment rate is decreasing in the job filling probability q. The endogenous steady state rate of unemployment is higher than the observed U.S. rate. However it can be justified by interpreting the unmatched workers in the model as being both unemployed and partly out of the labor force. As argued by Trigari (2009), this interpretation is consistent with the abstraction in the model from labor force participation choices.
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Importantly, notice in our model the steady state ratio between jobs created by new firms (JC new ) and total job creation (JC) is given by
for the calibration used this implies that job creation by new producers account for about 25 per cent of total (gross) job creation, close to the quarterly U.S. average of 20 per cent reported by Jaimovich and Floetotto (2008) . Finally, notice that the ratio between workers employed by first period incumbent firms (
Thus, since we set δ = 0.025 this implies that new firms account for about 2.5 percent of total employment, slightly lower than the 3 percent 18 Krause and Lubik (2007) calibrate their model to deliver an unemployment rate of 12 per cent on the basis of this motivation. Many studies in the search and matching literature feature much higher unemployment rates. For example Andolfatto's (1996) reported by Haltiwanger et al. (2010) as the average value for the U.S. between 1976 and 2005. To sum up, in our model new entrants create on average a relevant fractions of new jobs while accounting just for a small share of overall employment, thus being in accordance with US data.
Business Cycle Analysis
In what follows we will study the impulse response functions (IRFs) to a productivity shock, and then we will evaluate the second order moments. We compare the performance of the Cournot model to two alternative models: i) the "Standard Search" model. This is a version of our model with no entry costs, where each firm has a single worker and where goods market are characterized by monopolistic competition. In this case the dynamics of the number of firms is the same as the dynamics of aggregate employment and the price markups is constant; ii) the "Entry-Only" model. This is a version of our model characterized by monopolistic competition. The Entry-Only model features the number of firms as a state variable, as in our benchmark model with Cournot competition, but features constant markups. Thus, when compared to the Cournot model, it allows to understand the role played by strategic interactions for the dynamics of the variables in which we are interested.
Importantly, the calibration strategy is identical across the models. In particular, the replacement rate, which is known to be relevant for the propagation of technology shocks on labor market variables, is held constant across models. The Cournot model reproduces the estimated dynamics of the price markup, aggregate profits, the unemployment rate and the labor share of income. In particular, unemployment and price markups are countercyclical, while aggregate profits are procyclical. The response of aggregate profits is consistent with the evidence reported in Figure 1 . Indeed, as in the structural VAR, profits increase by about 2 percent on impact and then revert inertially to their initial level slightly undershooting their long run value. The response of aggregate profits is instead moderate in the two alternative models. Further, in line with our VAR, and also with the empirical evidence reported by Rios-Rull and Santaeulàlia-Llopis (2010), the Cournot model replicates the dynamics of labor share of income, which is countercyclical on impact and overshoots its long run value for several periods. The response of unemployment is countercyclical in the three models, but amplified in the Cournot framework. Recall that the Cournot framework and the "Entry Only" model differ just because of the price markup variability, which is thus the source of the amplification. Figure 3 , where lines have the same meaning as in Figure 2 , helps understanding the transmission mechanism of technology shock in our models. Entrants and the Number of Firms to a one standard deviation technology shock under alternative models.
A positive technology shock creates expectations of future profits which lead to the entry of firms. New firms post a large amount of vacancies to reach their desired size. This results in a stronger and more persistent response of unemployment with respect to that delivered by the Standard Search model, as displayed in Figure 2 . Given entry is subject to a one period time-to-build lag the total number of firms, N t , does not change on impact, but builds up gradually. 21 Figure 2 shows that in the Cournot framework, stronger competition translates into a lower markup, which reaches its negative peak after few periods and then gradually reverts to the steady state. This leads to the countercyclical and overshooting dynamics of the labor share.
Notice that markup countercyclicality is essential to obtain the overshooting of the labor share. To see this, consider the definition of the labor share of income ls t = w t Ltht Y t , which in log deviations amounts to
In log-linear terms, the labor share equals the difference between the real wage and productivity. Bargaining over wages implies that only a fraction η of the increase in productivity goes to workers. As a resultŵ t <Â t on impact, and the labor share is countercyclical on impact. This is common across the models we consider, as shown in Figure 2 . However, just in the oligopolistic framework the labor share overshoots its long run value, consistently with the VAR evidence. The overshooting is strictly related to the shape of the re- 21 In the Standard Search model there is no meaningful distinction between firms and workers. For this reason we do not report the dynamics of N t , N e t and individual employment for the Standard Search model. sponse of the price markup. Equation (33) shows that a persistently lower markup acts as a shifter of the standard marginal product of labor allowing the real wage to rise relative to the average productivity of labor for several periods. Since ls t =ŵ t −Â t , this explains the overshooting of the labor share.
Second Moments
To further assess the implications of endogenous market structures for the business cycle, we compute second moments of some relevant macroeconomic variables in response to a one standard deviation technology shock. Table 1 reports the standard deviation, autocorrelation and correlation with output for four key variables: the unemployment rate, aggregate profits, the price markup and the labor share of income. The standard deviations are normalized relative to that of output.
Panel A of Table 1 reports estimates of conditional correlation between variables. Conditional cross correlations are obtained from our baseline VAR model. Notice that the dynamic pairwise cross correlation conditional on shock i, ρ xy/i , between variables x and y is computed as follows. Let Ψ x/i T be the vector containing the median of the distribution of impulse response of variable x to shock i over a time horizon of T periods, then In the same Table we report the moments produced by the models considered in the previous section, namely the Standard Search model, the Entry-Only model and the Cournot model. In terms of quantitative performance, we find no relevant difference between the Standard Search model and the Entry-Only model. By construction both cannot address markup countercyclicality, and thus cannot capture the dynamic correlation between output and the labor share of income, as well as the relative standard deviation of the latter. On the contrary, the Cournot model matches fairly well the relative variability of the price markup and that of the labor share of income. Further, as argued above, markup countercyclicality allows the Cournot framework to match the sign of the dynamics correlation between the labor share of income and output. This is not the case in the standard search model and in the Entry-Only model, where the sign of the cor-relation is the opposite of the empirical one. 23 Further, the Cournot model does slightly better than the standard search model at addressing the relative variability of unemployment and the negative dynamic correlation with output. All models underestimate the relative variability of profits. However, the Cournot model offers a better performance with respect to other models also in this respect, suggesting that the market structure matters to explain the variability of aggregate profits. Explaining the variability of aggregate profits is notoriously difficult, as argued by Lewis and Poilly (2012) .
We see the performance of our Cournot model as a relative success. First, our model can explain stylized facts about which the benchmark search model is silent. Second to the best our knowledge, our model is the first that can account for the joint dynamics of profits, the price markup and the labor share of income in response to a technology shock. Third, in response to the shock, it delivers the same performance of the standard search model at addressing the relative variability and contemporaneous correlation of the unemployment rate with output, while it outperforms it at explaining the variability of the other variables considered. For these reasons we claim that endogenous market structures are a relevant transmission channel of technology shocks in an otherwise standard model of search in the labor market. 
Conclusions
We provide VAR evidence for the US economy suggesting that an expansionary technology shock leads to a decrease in the unemployment rate and in the price markup, together with an increase in aggregate profits. In response to the shock, the labor share of income falls on impact, overshoots its long-run level and returns to its initial level after several periods.
To match these facts, we develop a DSGE model where endogenous market structures and matching frictions in the labor market interact endogenously. We account for strategic interactions among producers and for the extensive margin of job creation due to entry and exit of firms from the market. Strategic interactions in the form of Cournot competition imply that the price markup depends negatively on the number of competitors in the market. Since the latter is procyclical in the model, as in the data, the price markup is countercyclical. Thanks to this mechanims our model delivers IRFs to a technology shock which are qualitatively consistent with the empirical ones. Further, we show that the Cournot model quantitatively outperforms both the standard labor search model and a model characterized by constant markups in replicating business cycle moments of the main macroeconomics variables in response to a productivity shock. For these reasons we argue that the price markup countercyclicality delivered by our model with Cournot competition in the goods market is a key factor to jointly account for the empirical facts we have documented.
Our analysis could be extended in various dimensions. One aspect we neglect is the asymmetry between market competitors in terms of both size and the probability of exit form the market. Davis et al. (2009) document that the distribution of vacancy creation is strongly biased in favor of small firms; Haltiwanger et al. (2010) show that younger firms are more likely to exit from the market than more mature firms. Implementing these features in the model is left for future research.
